This paper explores apparent shifts in the cultural use of psychoanalytic concepts, from narcissism, through melancholia, to paranoia. It tries to track these shifts, very loosely, in relation to changes in sociocultural and political atmospheres, noting that none of the shifts are complete, that each one leaves previous states of being and of mind at least partially in place. Narcissism was perhaps the term of choice for examining the problem of forging relationships that feel meaningful in a context of rapid change and neoliberal expansion; then melancholia was (and is) drawn on to conceptualise the challenge of confronting loss and colonial 'theft'; and now the annexation of the polity -and of everyday life -by massively insidious surveillance produces a culture and subjecthood that is fundamentally, and understandably, paranoid.
as such by governing practices that are not solely operating in the Foucauldian realm of biopower, nor with rational assumptions about risk, but rather treat the subject 'as someone who is anxious, under stress and increasingly insecure and is asked to manage its neurosis.' The neurotic subject, Isin claims (Ibid.),'is one whose anxieties and insecurities are objects of government not in order to cure or eliminate such states but to manage them.' The apparatus of surveillance is part of this: it is not just imposed on the subject as an order of control, but is also welcomed by that subject as a way of dealing with anxiety -however unsuccessful this might turn out to be.
I have great sympathy with these approaches and an interest in the reflexivity of social and affective states as they co-construct one another. In this paper, however, I want to push for an understanding of the contemporary citizen of the surveillance society as less 'neurotic' than 'paranoid', even though the idea that we manage ourselves through anxiety is a compelling one and is shared by both these characterisations. The argument requires a slightly slow development as it is located in a history of the use of psychoanalytic terminology to describe cultural phenomena and experiencethe famous 'culture of narcissism ' (Lasch, 1979) , but also 'melancholic culture' and various provocations on 'psychotic' postmodernism (Frosh 1991; Khanna, 2004; Walsh, 2014) . In essence, the argument runs that the time of narcissism, if it ever existed in a pure form, has run its course.
The experiential problematic facing people in western societies may well once have been of how, in the face of insecurity of selves and a kind of thinness of relational capacity, it might feel impossible to form intimate and enduring links with others; and how a defence against this would be the surface-fixated, manipulative relationships underpinned by rage that constitute the category of narcissism. There is certainly some evidence for this, as Lasch but also the psychoanalysts on whom he drew (Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1975 , for example) showed; and as aficionados of American Psycho (2000) will know, there remains a big social pull towards, and enjoyment in, the sorts of hate-filled paranoia that active narcissism can induce.
2 Nevertheless, times change and with them the affective cultures that surround us. From the early 1990s onwards, fuelled in the West by the AIDs crisis and by 9/11 -but perhaps it was always lurking as a counterweight to the fantasy of omnipotence that surrounds narcissism -appreciation of the realities of loss came to the fore, and with it the shadows of sadness, coded for all time by Freud (1917) as 'mourning and melancholia'.
…To Melancholia Judith Butler's (1997; 2005) trajectory is exemplary here, as it often is given that she is one of the most astute observers and theoreticians of contemporary social engagement. From the performativity work of the early 1990s, which in truth contained the seeds of much that was to come, she moved to thinking about what fixes the possibilities of performance, and thence rapidly to what has to be given up as identity structures cohere around invisible points of origin and meaning, which of course they slip away from all the time as well. I will not labour this here, but simply note how powerfully Butler's use of the psychoanalytic frame of melancholia has allowed her to conjure the affects associated with loss, and also how it has enabled her to think about ways in which what appears to be past and formally 'occluded' (Butler, 2005) might also provide the tools for developing a quasi-messianic imaginary that can reach into the future. In this, her development of Walter
Benjamin's imagery of the voices of the past oppressed 'flashing up' in a revolutionary present is central (Butler, 2012) : as with other invocations of the melancholic, it suggests that the preservation of the lost object as an unmourned traumatic psychic and political element has the effect of preserving its possibility for a kind of revolutionary 'return'. The lost object has never been worked through and grieved, hence never been broken down and incorporated into the psyche. It stands there, consequently, as something that threatens and promises from the margins of personal and social history, ready to reclaim its place as the unmourned and still raw underside of domination.
Not surprisingly, this has been an attractive general myth for some postcolonial thinkers (Khanna, 2004) ; but it has also attracted criticism from those not slow to point out that the fantasy of return is always untenable. There is no return to the way things were, there is no pure lost object kept in wraps for when it will be needed again, everything happens in the now, and what we draw on from the past is always refracted through what has happened since. After colonialism is not the same as before, any more than 'after' slavery is the same as some pristine state of freedom. Melancholic histories are retained, even if the melancholic object is allowed into the light of day.
Haunting
The narrative I have just given, abbreviated though it is, perhaps points to the presence of a haunted consciousness that runs through much cultural theory -and, I think, much contemporary psychosocial experience. For many writers, especially those drawing on psychoanalysis, there is something ghostly about the way the psyche is inhabited by its losses. Diana Fuss (1995) hidden loves and unsuspected desires.' These things are the everyday concern of psychoanalysis and have been theorised in various ways, including influentially through Abraham and Torok's (1976) notion of the 'crypt' as that which both hides away secrets and attracts attention to them. What I mean here is simply that we are each run through with the unspoken histories that we have experienced and that are passed on to us -this is what makes them 'cultural' rather than just personal matters, which we do not necessarily directly experience, yet still share in. These kinds of hauntings have dual effects: they trouble us with shivers of feeling, so we know that we have an unmourned element to our psychic lives; but they also grant us depth. Without ghosts, we truly are narcissistic, living only in the present and manipulating it to protect ourselves against feeling; with them we may be melancholic, but at least it is in relation to a deep vein of affect. We may not know what has been loved and lost, but it leaves a trace that we become open to; otherwise the feelings of sadness and regret would have no substance.
These days I keep reworking things, accreting something new to them each time, I hope, but also noting the patterns that return. In the days of the culture of narcissism, an important theme was one of paternal failure. Indeed, this was a part of what turned out to be its conservative, nostalgic undercurrent. Julie Walsh (2014) has examined this under the heading of 'critical declinism', which in turn seems to me to be in a long tradition of critiquing social progress in terms of 'degeneration'.
This has predecessors in religious thought, where the more one goes back the more 'pure' the vision, so the task of criticism is always to strip away the recent in order to find the authentic past at work. 3 Psychoanalysis is exemplary here. In what other 'science' do we keep going back to the beginning, to the work of the Founder, in order to uncover what is genuine, pure and 'true'? This is still very much the case within psychoanalytic practice, where Freud's work is taught as the foundation of psychoanalytic thinking -not just its history -to all trainees and students, and where 3 An example comes from orthodox Judaism, which holds that the entire Torah was revealed to Moses on Mount Sinai and then passed down through subsequent generations in written form but also as an oral elaboration, and that without the oral commentary the written narrative could not be made sense of. The problem is that the further away one gets from the source, the more confused the oral Torah might be, leading to all the loose and dead ends in Talmudic commentary, for example, when it was finally written down in the second to sixth centuries CE. This means that the task of true rabbinic scholarship -exemplified in Maimonides' twelfth century work Mishneh Torah -was often seen as to get rid of the modern speculations, to return to the true origin. The older the better; it is in the past that truth resides, and we decline from there. One of the most emotional prayers, which resonates with a good deal of postcolonial fantasy even though it actually dates from a thousand years ago or more, is 'return our days as of old.' later work is presented as much as commentary on as it is development of Freud. We saw it too in the Controversial Discussions that forged modern British psychoanalysis: the big question to be settled between Anna Freud and Melanie Klein was that of who was the true follower of Freud?
Whose approach was 'scientifically' supported, and whose was consistent with the real truth to be gleaned from the helpfully contradictory claims of Freud himself (King and Steiner, 1991) ? And of course there was Lacan, with his 'return to Freud', dispensing with the 'oral, genital and phallic' stages of other psychoanalysts, as he suggests in his allusion to the sexual difference debates (Lacan, 1958) , to read Freud as holy writ, albeit with his own rather mischievous twist. Each of these analysts used Freud to warrant her or his own claims, but this was done precisely because in the collective mind of psychoanalysts since Freud psychoanalysis has become a muddle, has declined in creativity and insight, has accumulated compromises and adaptations until it is at times unrecognisable as what it once was and was meant to be. Such is life, I guess: we start out with hope and reality gets in the way -but we should note that this is the opposite way of thinking about things from the narrative of progress to which Freud himself was very attached even if he also doubted it, and even if he located the source of unconscious meaning in the personal and phylogenetic past.
Messianism
My point here is in danger of getting lost in whimsy, so let me return actively to it. The notion of narcissistic culture is a species of degeneration theory, in which the loss of a framework of tradition and authentic engagement with reality is lamented and tied theoretically, at least in certain places, to a regret for the loss of authority and hence a potent paternal function. Melancholic culture also has plenty of resonance with lost pasts, of course; indeed, this is really what defines it as melancholic. It is Freud's Mourning and Melancholia (1917) that establishes the ground here: a melancholic object is one that is not recognised and therefore comes back to haunt, much as an unprocessed trauma might do; this is painful, self-defeating and self-damaging. On the other hand, the fact that the melancholic object is left psychically untouched means that if it is capable of recovery it holds in its being the possibility of a kind of return of the repressed that is not damaging, though it might be deeply unsettling. It is, in fact, revolutionary in a double sense: revolution as a return (going round in circles) and revolution as a radical break. Writing about Walter Benjamin, who in turn was responding to Gershom Scholem's (1941) mobilisation of the Kabbalistic myth of the breaking of the 'sefirot', the destruction of the containers of the divine sparks that puts history into motion, Butler comments (2011, p.83) , 'The Messiah is neither a person nor a historical event; it can be understood neither as anthropomorphism not as teleology; rather, it is a memory of suffering from another time that interrupts and reorients the politics of this time.'
This secular messianism is potentially a powerfully political form of haunting, stopping linear time in its tracks and punctuating it with a different rhythm -it produces a new direction, a kind of syncopation that alters everything. We fall into the past in order to return different, with a new orientation. Butler (Ibid.) notes that the 'flashing up' of the lights of the sefirot is read by Benjamin not as a final gathering in of Jewish exiles, but as 'a revolutionary chance in the fight for the oppressed past.' She wants this to allow a kind of breaking-apart of the 'surface of time' that then transposes 'the memory of suffering into the future of justice, not as revenge but as the figuring of a time in which the history that covers over the history of oppression might cease.' This means that there is no actual lost object simply to be recovered, a presence that will return to lead everything to its satisfactory, integrated conclusion -the traditional view of the reunification of the sparks, which sees the fragmentation of society (the 'breaking of the vessels') as a degraded system that needs to be put right, demanding a reparative response that is itself the marker of the messianic, and once again sharing in the framework of degeneration or critical decline. By contrast, Butler's use of Benjamin advances the cause of continuing 'flashing up' of the hidden sparks, in which those who have lost most and who are written out of humanity have the chance to return, to make their presence felt.
rejection of the signifier of the Name-of-the-Father that allows the subject to take up a position in the symbolic -which is to say, in culture. Many Lacanians advance this idea to see paranoia as a constitutive function of the subject in as well as outside society. For example, Vanier (2010, p.216) notes how Lacan observed that 'in each of us there is a paranoid function: the ego. The ego, constituted by successive identifications enacted during the mirror stage (stade du miroir), is essentially narcissistic-this explains why paranoid reactions are so frequent in all people, even those who do not present a true psychotic structure.' We are back both to the paternal function and to the idea that we are haunted by troubling identifications. However, I want to draw on another element implicit in the Lacanian scheme. This is that the paranoid is an absolute master -or rather, an absolute adherent of the Discourse of the Master, the one who knows for certain what is going on. Contrasting the paranoid with the hysteric, Verhaeghe (1997) claims that the paranoid subject, refusing the Oedipal Name-of-the-Father, has to take hold of a set of precarious, self-developed certainties that will anchor her or his subjecthood. 'From a structural point of view,' writes Verhaeghe (p.69), 'the paranoid subject is not divided and shows no lack whatsoever: he knows.' In the context of the surveillance society, this can easily become the paranoid assertion, 'They are really out to get us; there is an evil conspiracy; they know what we think; they are opening our (e)mail; they are watching us.' This is the kind of mode of knowing that is impervious to interpretation, argument or reason. Indeed, what characterises the paranoiac is a lack of lack, an inability to acknowledge the absent space within and instead the compulsion to cover it over with certainty.
Unfortunately, in a surveillance society there is plenty of opportunity for partial confirmation of this knowledge: just look at the cameras in the street and ask what they are recording, and why, and for whom. The paranoiac is perhaps the one who is perfectly adjusted to such a society, which makes all the more radical Lacan's stringent recommendation to his clinical trainees not to know too much. In the service of what Nobus and Quinn (2005) call the 'fall' of knowledge, Lacan (1975, p.73) writes, How many times have I said to those under my supervision, when they say to me -I had the impression he meant this or that -that one of the things we must guard most against is to understand too much, to understand more than what is in the discourse of the subject. To interpret and to imagine one understands are not the same things. It is precisely the opposite. I would go so far as to say that it is on the basis of a kind of refusal of understanding that we push open the door to analytic understanding.
The openness of psychoanalysis -the way the Discourse of the Analyst involves, precisely, vacating the position of mastery and knowledge -can perhaps be understood here as antagonistic to paranoia. But can it work, we might ask, in social conditions in which someone always seems to know about us, in which we are rightly aware that secrets are being kept, and an unaccountable bank of information is being stored up for possible future use?
Excursus
Has melancholia given way to paranoia; is what we are now haunted by a persecutory image of the external world, too often confirmed in reality? I do not want to judge this or assert it too stronglywe are dealing with metaphors and models, which might or might not help us understand the position we find ourselves in. Nevertheless, I will wager something here. The pervasiveness of surveillance and the linked emergence of a culture of anxiety about security and terror, have crept into contemporary society through all sorts of quotidian means and are reflected in shifts in psychic states. These shifts are in various directions: narcissism and melancholia, for instance, are not outmoded concepts, but they are increasingly overlaid by paranoid states of mind that accurately reflect the problematics of people's lives. This is not to say that paranoia is a 'healthy' response to current realities, any more than are narcissism or melancholia; it is only to suggest that it makes sense, that it is a representation of the state of the psychosocial subject under conditions in which it is very hard to trust, or even to understand, what is going on around us.
